Parol Evidence in Washington: The Use of Extrinsic Evidence to Address the Integration and Interpretation of Documents by Olson, Arden J.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 52 Number 4 
10-1-1977 
Parol Evidence in Washington: The Use of Extrinsic Evidence to 
Address the Integration and Interpretation of Documents 
Arden J. Olson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arden J. Olson, Comment, Parol Evidence in Washington: The Use of Extrinsic Evidence to Address the 
Integration and Interpretation of Documents, 52 Wash. L. Rev. 923 (1977). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol52/iss4/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
PAROL EVIDENCE IN WASHINGTON:
THE USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO
ADDRESS THE INTEGRATION AND
INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS
The body of doctrines subsumed under the label "parol evidence
rule" has long produced chronic litigation' and scholarly headaches. 2
The parol evidence rule provides that when parties have embodied an
agreement in writing, that writing may not be varied or contradicted
by extrinsic evidence.3 This bare statement, however, sheds no light
on two issues crucial to its implementation: first, what evidence may
be considered by courts in deciding whether a transaction has been
integrated or reduced to a writing; and second, to what extent may
extrinsic evidence be considered for the purpose of interpreting a
completely integrated writing. 4
Washington judicial treatment of these related concerns, the
integration 5 and interpretation6 of written contracts, constitutes the
I. "[T] he so-called parol evidence rule is a euphemism masking a congeries of
standards which are in any rational view internally somewhat inconsistent by their
usual statement and also unduly difficult to apply in concrete situations at trials....
[T] he so-called parol evidence rule has been considered in several hundred Washington
opinions-more often than any other general subject [relating to evidence] except the
subject of presumptions." 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE Evidence § 121,
at 124 (1965). "Any reader of advance sheets is well aware that most of the contract
decisions reported . . . involve the parol evidence rule and questions of interpreta-
tion .... Calamari & Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Princi-
ples of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. LJ. 333, 333 (1967). See also Shattuck, Con-
tracts in Washington, 1937-1957: Part 1, 34 WASH. L. REV. 345, 369 (1959).
2. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 213-214, at 434-35
(Ist ed. 1954); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 390 (1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2400, at 3 (3d ed. 1940).
3. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573, at 368 (Rev. ed. 1960); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 2, § 2425, at 75-76; 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 631, at 948 (3d ed. 1961).
Extrinsic evidence includes all evidence, oral or written, which arises outside a given
document. 3 A. CORBIN, supra, § 573, at 358; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra, § 631, at 948-
49.
4. See Note, The Parol Evidence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 972,
973 (1969).
5. The term "integration," which apparently was coined by Dean Wigmore, has
been used in at least two ways. For Wigmore, it denotes the "embodiment in a single
memorial" of a legal act. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2401, at 7. Corbin uses the
term to refer only to final and complete embodiments of agreements, 3 A. CORBIN,
supra note 3, § 573, at 359, in contrast to Wigmore's use which allows for partial in-
tegration, covering less than an entire transaction. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§
2400, 2425-2453.
This comment uses the term "integration" or "integrated writing" to refer to any
writing intended by the parties to it as a final statement of an agreement's terms. See
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focus of this comment. Part One will distinguish integration from in-
terpretation and highlight factors which bear on the choices between
conflicting approaches to extrinsic evidence. 7 Part Two will examine
the rules governing the ascertainment of integration, by which courts
decide whether the parties embodied their transaction in a written
memorial, rendering it subject to the parol evidence rule. Part Three
will analyze the analogous rules governing the extent to which a court
interpreting the parties' language may look to the circumstances sur-
rounding the document's execution. Finally, a suggestion will be made
to improve Washington's approach to extrinsic evidence and to re-
solve current inconsistencies in the law.
I. INTEGRATION AND INTERPRETATION: PROLOGUE
The relationship between the rules of interpretation and the doc-
trine of integration must be clarified at the outset, for the failure of
courts clearly to distinguish the policies behind them has been a major
difficulty in this corner of the law.8 The doctrine of integration pro-
vides that a final agreement intended as such integrates or merges into
it all prior agreements between the parties on that subject. 9 The terms
of the agreement, therefore, are defined as a matter of substantive law
by the integrated writing.10 This doctrine is the substantive basis for
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(1) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970). Whether
such a writing is a complete and exclusive statement of an agreement is often the pri-
mary determination for a court to make in litigation over the agreement; see Part II
in'fra.
6. The word "interpretation" herein, following Corbin's definition, means the
process by which the parties' language is given meaning. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note
3, § 579. Thus it is not intended to include any of the processes by which a court
decides what language represents the terms of the agreement, such as the process of
determining whether the parties integrated their transaction. See J. THAYER, sUpra
note 2, at 410-11.
7. Extrinsic evidence includes all evidence, oral or written, arising outside a docu-
ment to which the parol evidence rule may apply. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 573,
at 358; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 631, at 948-49.
8. Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, 4 DuQ. L. REV. 337, 343
(1965-66); Note, Chief Justice Traynor and the Parol Evidence Rule, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 547, 555 (1970); e.g., Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wn. 2d 109, 121,
431 P.2d 961, 968 (1967); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 15 Wn. App.
314, 318, 549 P.2d 54, 57 (1976). See also 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 542; 9 J.
WIGMORE. spra note 2, § 2461.
9. See note 5 supra.
10. Barber v. Rochester, 52 Wn. 2d 691, 696, 328 P.2d 711, 714 (1958); 9 J.
WIGMIORE, supra note 2, § 2425; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 631, at 958. The pri-
mary import of the substantive nature of the doctrine is that it is not waived by
failure (a) to object to the admission of evidence barred by it or (b) to plead it in a
924
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the parol evidence rule; the rule excludes extrinsic evidence because
the doctrine of integration renders such evidence immaterial." Thus,
the term "parol evidence rule" may correctly be applied only to tests
protecting integrated writings from variation.
Nonetheless, rules governing evidence offered to interpret writings
which are admittedly integrated have also been referred to as facets of
the parol evidence rule.12 Interpretation is the process of ascribing
meaning to language;13 the issue is not whether evidence of extrinsic
terms may be considered, but rather whether extrinsic evidence pur-
porting to explain terms in the integrated writing is relevant and ad-
missible.' 4 The parol evidence rule is inapplicable to evidence which
responsive pleading. 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 1, § 121, at 124-25, and cases
cited therein.
The integration principle, insofar as it pertains to contracts, rests upon the intent
of the parties, for there is no requirement that contracting parties reduce their deal-
ings to final or exclusive writings. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2429; 4 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 3, § 633. This contrasts with other types of writings, such as negotiable in-
struments, wills, and deeds, which are integrated as a matter of law. 9 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 2, §§ 2450-2453; Hirt v. Entus, 37 Wn. 2d 418, 224 P.2d 620 (1950).
11. Strictly speaking, relevant evidence of terms extrinsic to an integrated writing
is inadmissible because of the evidentiary rule against admitting evidence tending to
show matter which is immaterial, i.e., substantively irrelevant. See C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 434 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). The doc-
trine of integration is the substantive principle which defines the terms constituting a
transaction, see note 10 supra, whereas the parol evidence rule provides that all terms
not integrated are immaterial to an integrated transaction, 4 S. WILLISTON, supra
note 3, § 631, at 955-63.
12. The imprecise use of the term "parol evidence rule" has engendered two sorts
of mischief. First, it has induced the misapprehension that the rule is a rule of evi-
dence; until recently most evidence textwriters felt obliged to deal with it. See authori-
ties cited in note 2 supra; cf. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, §§ 218-243 (McCor-
mick's treatment of parol evidence rule omitted from second edition).
Second, because the rule has been confused with an evidentiary principle and said
to render evidence "inadmissible," e.g., Truck-Trailer Equip. Co. v. S. Birch & Sons
Co., 38 Wn. 2d 583, 590, 231 P.2d 304, 308 (1951), the label "parol evidence rule"
has been applied to principles unrelated to integration which bear on the admissibility
of evidence-primarily to the rules concerning evidence offered in aid of interpreta-
tion. Although commentators agree that the parol evidence rule has no application to
such evidence, 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 542; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2470,
at 227; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 614; Calamari & Perillo, supra note 1, at 351-
53, courts often refuse to accept such a limitation. See Sweet, Contract Making and
Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and. Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036,
1048-50 (1968) and cases cited therein; Shattuck, supra note 1, at 375-76 and cases
cited therein. See also 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2400, 2458-2478.
The view that the parol evidence rule is irrelevant to interpretation is both an an-
swer to the linguistic issue regarding the proper use of the term "parol evidence rule"
and a substantive assertion that the rule is solely for the protection of integrated
instruments. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 579; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 631,
at 955; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 217; Sweet, supra, at 1048.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. The distinction between relevance and materiality, see note I 1 supra, relates
to the difference between the bases for excluding evidence offered (a) to prove ex-
925
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clarifies the meaning of a writing's terms; it bars only evidence which
varies or contradicts such terms.15 Consequently, other rules have
been developed to govern the admission of such evidence.1 6
The central question raised by the integration doctrine is whether
relevant extrinsic evidence may be considered by a court for the pur-
pose of determining whether and to what extent a writing has been
integrated. If such evidence is to be considered, a second question
arises, viz., what standard ought a court apply to the evidence to re-
solve issues of integration? Washington cases have split on both ques-
tions, espousing various tests on both the amount of evidence to be
considered and the standard to be applied to the evidence.
The primary interpretive issue, on the other hand, is whether ex-
trinsic evidence may aid in the interpretation of terms which appear
unambiguous. It is generally agreed that extrinsic interpretive evi-
dence is admissible to explain a patent ambiguity.' 7 The extent to
which such evidence is to be excluded absent such an ambiguity, how-
ever, is a matter which has found little unanimity among the authori-
ties.18
When considering the merits of alternate substantive approaches to
integration and interpretation, Washington courts ought to bear in
mind the procedural considerations which affect those approaches. As
Professor McCormick pointed out,19 one of the most significant pro-
cedural factors concerning extrinsic evidence is the judge's preemi-
nence over the jury: questions of integration are almost invariably de-
cided by the judge.20 This judicial control undoubtedly tends to
trinsic terms and (b) to interpret terms in the agreement. When evidence is offered to
prove terms extrinsic to a writing, the primary evidentiary issue is not whether that
evidence is relevant to show the terms, but whether the term, is material to the agree-
ment. When evidence is offered to show the meaning of a term in an agreement, the
question is not whether the term is material, but whether the evidence is relevant to
show the meaning of the term. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 434.
15. The difficulty involved here is distinguishing between evidence which merely
clarifies a writing and evidence which varies it. Its resolution must be a matter for the
trial judge, after consideration of the offered evidence. Calimari & Perillo, supra note
1, at 352; see Part III infia.
16. See Part III infra.
17. See, e.g., Grant County Constructors v. E. V. Lane Corp., 77 Wn. 2d 110, 121,
459 P.2d 947, 954 (1969).
18. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, §§ 535, 542, 542A, 579; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra
note 3, §§ 609, 627, 630; Calamari & Perillo. .upra note I, at 352; Shattuck, supra
note 1, at 373-76 and cases cited therein.
19. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 214.
20. This judicial role stems from the substantive nature of the integration princi-
ple; although the parties' intent may be a matter of fact, the admissibility of extrinsic
926
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promote consistent results in commercial cases regardless of the stan-
dard governing the judge's determinations. 21 Also, the relative availa-
bility of summary judgment under various approaches to extrinsic
evidence bears on their desirability. The spectre of spurious claims,
brought against businesses in the hope of settlement to avoid litigation
costs, is minimized insofar as such claims may be disposed of through
summary judgment. To the extent that a resolution of integration is-
sues requires factual determinations regarding the parties' actual in-
tent, summary judgment may be unavailable if that intent is dis-
puted.22
II. DETERMINING THE FACT AND EXTENT OF
INTEGRATION
To apply the parol evidence rule to a writing, a judge must deter-
mine whether the writing is integrated and, if so, whether the integra-
tion is complete. 23 The fact of integration may be an easy matter to
evidence to vary a writing is purely a legal issue. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §
2430, at 98; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 638, at 1042. Cf. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note
3, § 595, at 570-71 (judge may give close cases to jury).
Interpretation is also normally a judicial matter. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 554,
at 222; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2461, at 188; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, §
616, at 649. When disputes arise upon which reasonable men could differ, however,
the jury decides which meaning was intended. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 554, at
226-27; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 616, at 652.
21. The fear that commercial instability would arise from jury control of integra-
tion rests on the assumption that commercial litigation often involves an economic
underdog with whom juries might sympathize. Although the legitimacy of this fear
is difficult to substantiate with data, judges quite likely have more perspective than
do juries regarding the law's need for stability. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule
as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YAL L.J. 365, 366-69 (1932).
22. See Barovic v. Cochran Elec. Co., I1 Wn. App. 563, 524 P.2d 261 (1974)
(summary judgment reversed on ground that parties' intent regarding integration was
a material issue of fact); Diel v. Beekman, 1 Wn. App. 874, 880, 465 P.2d 212, 216
(1970).
23. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 1, at 335-37. An incomplete or partial integra-
tion is "a final expression of the agreement between the parties only as to such terms
as are included therein." University Properties, Inc. v. Moss, 63 Wn. 2d 619, 621, 388
P.2d 543, 544 (1964). See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 581; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra
note 3, § 633, at 1014-15.
The question whether an instrument is totally or partially integrated is often equiva-
lent in practical terms to the question whether it is integrated at all, unless one takes
Williston's stance that partial integration must be detertnined solely from the face of a
writing. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 633, at 1014-16. As Corbin observed, a par-
tially integrated writing "does not prevent its own variation by extrinsic evidence," at
least to the extent the oral terms add to the written portion. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note
3, § 581, at 441. A partially integrated writing precludes extrinsic evidence only to
the extent the evidence contradicts it; thus provisions arguably consistent with the
927
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determine; the extent to which a writing is integrated often involves
more complex considerations.2 4 This complexity has been com-
pounded by the distinction between partial integrations and collateral
agreements. 25 A complete integration never precludes all extrinsic evi-
dence, for additional transactions between the parties may be shown
despite such an instrument if they are "collateral," i.e., independent of
the writing.2 6 Partial integrations prevent only their own contradiction
by extrinsic terms, thus precluding a greater or lesser amount of ex-
trinsic evidence depending on their scope.27
The partial integration and collateral agreement doctrines both
address the same fundamental issue, namely, the extent to which an
integrated instrument precludes evidence of additional terms.28 The
distinction between them depends on clear delineations between the
parties' transactions: a finding that the writing is partially integrated
permits terms related to the unintegrated portion of the action to be
shown, whereas a finding that the writing is completely integrated
permits only independent transactions to be proved. Because delinea-
tions between transactions are often muddled, the results under the
two doctrines are frequently indistinguishable. 29
writing are equally unaffected by partially integrated and entirely unintegrated docu-
ments.
Although the partial integration doctrine is similar to the "collateral agreement"
exception to the parol evidence rule in that it limits the preclusive effect of a writing.
5 R. MEISENHOLDER, suipra note I, § 124, at 139, it constitutes a broader inroad into
the integration doctrine insofar as it permits a jury to consider evidence of terms
which admittedly pertain to the same transaction as an integrated writing. This severely
limits the preclusive effect of the written portion of a partial integration. 3 A. CORBIN.
supra note 3. § 581, at 441.
24. Under any of the tests discussed below, an integration will be found if the
parties intend a writing to be final on at least one term. This threshold is minimal, for
a contractual writing (i.e., a promissory writing assented to by both parties) would
have no purpose at all if it imposed no rights or duties not subject to objection. The
extent to which a writing is integrated is normally the critical issue; disputes common-
ly arise over whether a writing is exclusive of additional terms. Since one might easily
concede that a writing is final as far as it goes, it is inappropriate to resolve the extent
issue by finding a writing to be integrated (i.e., final) without inquiring whether it is
complete or exclusive. See WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202 (1976) (distinguishes final
agreements from complete and exclusive agreements).
25. See, e.g., Becker v. Lagerquist Bros., Inc., 55 Wn. 2d 425, 348 P.2d 423
(1960); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nicholas, 2 Wn. 2d 128, 97 P.2d 633 (1939).
26. This independence may or may not include separate consideration. 3 A. CoR-
BIN, supra note 3, § 594, at 567; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 637.
27. 9 J. WIGMORE, suepra note 2, § 2430.
28. See 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note I, § 124.
29. See, e.g., Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wn. 2d 334, 343-49, 205 P.2d 628. 633-36
(1949); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nicholas, 2 Wn. 2d 128, 133-35, 97 P.2d 633, 635-
36(1939).
The distinction between partial integrations and collateral agreements is useful pri-
928
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A. Differing Standards in Washington Law
Commentators3 0 and courts31 alike have observed that certain
Washington Supreme Court decisions espouse inconsistent rules gov-
erning integration determinations. Three standards may be distin-
guished in recent cases. The older rule, which has been termed the
"mechanical test," permits a judge to consider only the language of a
writing.32 A more recent view adopts the so-called "intent test," which
allows judicial consideration of all relevant evidence. 33 Both of these
rules are subjective; i.e., they seek by different techniques to ascertain
the actual intent of the parties before the court. The third rule, herein
termed the "objective test," is largely indifferent to actual intent; the
fact and extent of integration turn on whether, considering the nature
of the writing and of the additional term, a reasonable person would
have included it in the writing. 34
In addition to these judicially-developed rules, a fourth test has
marily under the mechanical test (see Part I-A-1 infra); that rule permits a partial
integration to be shown only by noting a writing's incompleteness on its face, whereas
a collateral agreement may be shown by considering its relation to the writing. See
Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wn. 2d 334, 348-49, 205 P.2d 628, 636 (1949). The distinction
serves little purpose under the intent test, which permits a court to evaluate the com-
petence of all extrinsic terms by examining both the terms and the surrounding cir-
cumstances. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 581, at 441 (suggesting abandonment of
"partial integration" distinction).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202 distinguishes between integrations which pre-
clude inconsistent terms ("intended . .. as a final expression") and those which pre-
clude consistent additional terms ("intended also as a complete and exclusive state-
ment"). WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202 (1976). The basis of this distinction relates
not to the evidence which may be considered, but only to the extent to which the
parties intended the writing to control. See Part II-A-4 infra.
30. 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 1, § 121; Dano, Parol Evidence-Its Practical
Meaning and Usage, in 2 TRIAL ADVOCACY 79, 89-96 (Wn. State Bar Ass'n 1975).
But see Comment, Parol Evidence Rule-In Need of Change, 8 GONZAGA L. REV. 88,
89-91 (1972). See also Shattuck, supra note 1, at 374-77, noting a similar divergence
in the rules for contract interpretation in Washington.
31. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 15 Wn. App. 314, 549 P.2d 54
(1976); Lynch v. Higley, 8 Wn. App. 903, 510 P.2d 663 (1973); Eagle Ins. Co. v.
Albright, 3 Wn. App. 256, 268, 474 P.2d 920, 928-29 (1970).
32. The mechanical test protects only writings complete on their face; it excludes
extrinsic evidence except to the extent such evidence shows consistent terms which are
"collateral" or independent of the instrument. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
240(1)(b) (1932); 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 638, at 1039-43; 5 R. MEISENHOLDER,
supra note 1, § 121, at 129-30. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nicholas, 2 Wn. 2d
128, 97 P.2d 633 (1939).
33. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 573, at 359-60; 9 J. WIOMORE, supra note 2, §
2430, at 97-98; 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 1, § 121, at 132. See, e.g., Barber v.
Rochester, 52 Wn. 2d 691, 328 P.2d 711 (1958).
34. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 638, at 1041. See, e.g., Becker v. Lagerquist
Bros., Inc., 55 Wn. 2d 425, 348 P.2d 423 (1960).
929
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been adopted in section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code.35
Under this statutory rule, written terms generally may not be contra-
dicted, but additional terms may be proved absent a finding that a
complete and exclusive integration was intended. The test for finding
an integration is subjective: look to the parties' intent. The test for
evaluating its completeness is objective, utilizing the standard of a rea-
sonable person.3 6
1. The mechanical test37
Until recently, Washington cases predominantly applied a strict
standard which limited the integration inquiry to the face of the
writing. 38 This test was stated by the Washington Supreme Court as
follows: "[W] here a written agreement purports to cover the entire
subject matter with respect to which the parties are contracting, and
fraud or mutual mistake is not claimed, evidence of a contempora-
neous or prior oral agreement contradicting or altering the terms of
the writing is inadmissible."3 9
The foremost proponent of this approach to integration was Pro-
fessor Williston, who maintained that the benefits of the parol evi-
dence rule are possible only under such a test. 40 Although the preem-
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202 (1976) (reproduced at note 76 infra).
36. See note 76 infra. See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-202, Official Com-
ment 3 (1966).
See also Note, Chief Justice Traynor and the Parol Evidence Rule, 22 STAN. L. REV.
547, 549-50 (1970), which distinguishes a more restrictive version of the "mechanical
test" forbidding even consistent collateral transactions to be shown. Any contemporary
validity of such a test is doubtful, see 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 594; in any case
it does not apply in Washington. 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 2, § 123; see Dano,
supra note 30, at 112-14.
37. The term "mechanical test" is not used here in a derogatory sense, but because
of its prior use. See Lynch v. Higley, 8 Wn. App. 903, 908, 510 P.2d 663, 667 (1973).
See generally 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 1, § 121.
38. 5 R.'MEISEN HOLDER, supra note 1, § 121, at 129-30 and cases cited at nn.13-14
therein. See also Shattuck, supra note 1, at 379-80 and cases cited at n.428 therein.
39. Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wn. 2d 334, 345, 205 P.2d 628, 634 (1949) (emphasis
in original). The cases cited by the court for this proposition make clear that a writing
need only be complete on its face to "purport" to cover the entire matter; it need not
contain an explicit statement to that effect. See Hazlett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 14 Wn. 2d 124, 127 P.2d 273 (1942); Alaska Pac. Salmon Co. v. Matthewson.
3 Wn. 2d 560, 101 P.2d 606 (1940); Allen v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 76 Wash.
51, 135 P. 621 (1913).
40. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, §§ 633, 638. See also RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 240 (1932).
Williston reasoned that, although parties may very well omit portions of their
transactions from a writing, writings very rarely explicitly address the question of in-
tegration. If extrinsic evidence of additional agreements were competent to show there
930
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inence of the mechanical test has recently been questioned, 41 many
Washington decisions reflect its continued vitality.42
The mechanical test restricts the inquiry regarding both the fact
and extent of integration to the terms of the instrument in question. If
a writing purports to be integrated, the extent of that integration must
be determined by reference to the written terms; a partial integration
may be established only by proof that the writing is incomplete on its
face.43
The advantages and disadvantages of such a formal44 approach to
decisionmaking were recently outlined by Professor Powers. 45 Advan-
tages include its predictability, ease of application to particular facts,
and tendency to place responsibility on rulemakers rather than deci-
sionmakers, who might arbitrarily decide similar cases differently.
The primary disadvantages of a formal rule are evidenced by the
"mapping problem" and the "freezing problem." As Professor Powers
points out, "rules do not always translate (map) perfectly the policies
which generated them into results in individual cases."4 6 They may
also "freeze the decisionmaking process into a set of rules that reflect
values of one era which are no longer held in the next. '47
The merits of the mechanical test have been widely debated. 48 Its
claim to predictability and easy application is of questionable validity
given the amount of litigation it has generated. 49 Its value in pro-
tecting against arbitrary decisionmakers is uncertain, because map-
ping difficulties (e.g., its inability to distinguish carefully negotiated
transactions from casual agreements using boilerplate forms50) and
was no integration without such an indication in the writing, the practical value of
the parol evidence rule would be minimized. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 633, at
1014-16.
41. See Parts II-A-2 & II-A-3 infra. See, e.g., Black v. Evergreen Land Develop-
ers, Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 241, 450 P.2d 470 (1969); Lynch v. Higley, 8 Wn. App. 903, 510
P.2d 663 (1973).
42. 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 1, § 121.
43. See note 23 supra.
44. "A formal decision uses less than all available relevant information by follow-
ing a rule which screens from the decisionmaker's consideration all information not
specifically invoked by the rule.... [A] nonformal decisionmaker reaches a 'proper'
result without first screening any information from consideration." Powers, Formalism
and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REV. 27, 28 (1976).
45. Id. at 28-37.
46. Id.at 31.
47. Id.
48. See sources cited at note 152 infra.
49. See note I supra.
50. See Green River Valley Foundation, Inc. v. Foster, 78 Wn. 2d 245, 257-60,
473 P.2d 844, 851-53 (1970) (concurring opinion).
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freezing problems (e.g., its inconsistency with waxing consumer pro-
tection concern and waning interest in freedom of contract 51 ) have
prevented courts from applying it uniformly. 52
2. The intent test
Recently, Washington courts have adopted a less rigid test for as-
certaining whether and to what extent a document is integrated. The
first major enunciation of this test came in Barber v. Rochester,5 3 a
1958 case in which the trial court excluded extrinsic evidence offered
to show that the three instruments before it did not comprehend all
the terms of a sale and exchange of businesses and real estate. The
state supreme court, reversing, held that the extent of integration is to
be determined with reference to all the relevant evidence, including
evidence of the intent of the parties.54
The "intent test" has as its foremost proponents Professors Corbin
51. See Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 241, 250-51, 450
P.2d 470, 476 (1969). See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). Loss occasioned a buyer when a
seller breaches his oral promise is analogous to economic loss suffered from a defec-
tive product; in both cases, the buyer loses the benefit of his bargain. Some courts have
allowed recovery for economic loss proximately resulting from a product's defect on
a theory of strict liability, id. at 822; a court applying the mechanical test. in contrast,
will not permit recovery on the oral promise.
52. Compare Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn. App. 78, 82, 538 P.2d 1238, 1242-
43 (1975) and Brother Int'l Corp. v. Nat'l Vacuum & Sewing Machine Stores, Inc., 9
Wn. App. 154, 157-59, 510 P2d 1162, 1164-65 (1973) with Lynch v. Higley, 8 Wn.
App. 903, 908-12, 510 P.2d 663, 667-69 (1973) and Diel v. Beekman. I Wn. App.
874. 878-80, 465 P.2d 212, 215-16 (1970).
53. 52 Wn. 2d 691, 328 P.2d 711 (1958). Although older cases may be found
which align with the intent test, the emphasis here will be upon cases beginning with
Barber, in which the intent test received its first explicit adoption in this state. See 5
R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 1, § 121, at 127-28, and cases cited therein for examples
of earlier decisions.
54. The court stated:
People have the right to make their agreements partly oral and partly in writ-
ing. or entirely oral or entirely in writing; and it is the court's duty to ascertain
from all relevant, extrinsic evidence, either oral or written, whether the entire
agreement has been incorporated in the writing or not. That is a question of fact.
52 Wn. 2d at 698, 328 P.2d at 715. Although citing authority from other jurisdictions
for this proposition, the court's opinion ignored Washington precedent to the con-
trary; indeed, it appears to overrule sub silentio the mechanical test's tenet that ex-
trinsic evidence is incompetent in the face of a writing purporting to be complete. 5
R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note I, § 124. at 139-40.
Consistent with the objective theory of contracts, only intentions mutually manifested
by the parties may be proven. The unexpressed impressions of one party may not be
used to establish terms of a contract. Dwelley v. Chesterfield, 88 Wn. 2d 33 1. 560 P.2d
353 (1977); Frazier v. Kern, 18 Wn. App. 93, 566 P.2d 956 (1977); Seattle-First Nat'l
Bank v. Hawk, 17 Wn. App. 251, 562 P.2d 260 (1977).
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and Wigmore. 55 They take the position that no instrument is sufficient
to show whether it constitutes an integration of the parties' transac-
tion, since some extrinsic evidence is always necessary to relate a doc-
ument to the factual situation surrounding its execution. Under the
intent test, a judge must assess all the evidence to determine whether
and to what extent the parties intended a given document to be inte-
grated. If a valid and complete integration is found, then evidence
conditionally admitted will be rendered irrelevant by operation of the
parol evidence rule.56
When a writing contains language to the effect that it is fully inte-
grated, the intent test does not deprive such language of all effective-
ness. The test does, however, limit the conclusiveness of such language
by requiring that extrinsic facts comport with the statement that the
writing is integrated before the provisions of the writing are enforced
upon unwary parties.57 Corbin's approach makes the credibility of
extrinsic evidence a judge's sole guide. Notwithstanding the superior
probative value of a writing, if a judge is convinced that the parties
intended additional terms, evidence of such terms may not be ex-
cluded.58 Although Wigmore seems to suggest that, if a document
deals with a particular subject of negotiation at all, then there is a pre-
sumption that the document was intended to integrate that subject, his
standard also turns on credibility.59 His "presumption" is not a con-
55. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 573, at 360; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2430,
at 98. See also Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545
(1968) (Traynor, CJ.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1970).
56. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, §§ 582-583; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2430.
Corbin treats the issue of ascertaining integration purely as one of fact, which the
judge may decide, or, in close cases, allow the jury to decide. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note
3, § 595. This stance is criticized by McCormick on the ground that courts will want
a more definite standard. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 214.
57. One of the criticisms of the mechanical test is that it has allowed the parol
evidence rule to be used by overreaching businesses against unsuspecting consumers,
since under the test the fact that parties made oral agreements ancillary to a written
transaction is immaterial if not evident upon the face of the writing. See Green River
Valley Foundation, Inc. v. Foster, 78 Wn. 2d 245, 258-59, 473 P.2d 844, 851-52
(1970) (concurring opinion).
58. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 583, at 469. After such evidence is admitted, its
weight and credibility become primary considerations; a person offering evidence of
the parties' mutual intent has the burden of proving that intent. Dwelley v. Chester-
field, 88 Wn. 2d 331, 560 P.2d 353 (1977).
59. "If [the particular element of the alleged extrinsic negotiation] is mentioned,
covered, or dealt with in the writing, then presumably the writing was meant to repre-
sent all of the transaction on that element .... " 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2430,
at 98-99.
Wigmore's statement has been claimed to contradict Corbin's credibility standard.
933
Washington Law Review Vol. 52: 923, 1977
elusive test;60 rather, it is one of several factors in deciding whether
the parties intended the writing to cover a particular subject. 61 Both
writers agree on the fundamental test; the effect under both ap-
proaches is to withhold judicial enforcement of recitations which fly
in the face of extrinsic evidence. 62
Clearly defining the extent of integration is less important under the
intent test than under the mechanical test. The practical issue is
whether the parties intended to include in a transaction a term ex-
trinsic to their writing. If a court determines that the term in question
covers a subject not integrated, it is irrelevant that other subjects are
integrated; the term in question may be proven. 63 The intent test looks
not only to the parties' intent regarding the entire transaction, but also
to their intent regarding the contested term.64 In ascertaining this in-
tent, no relevant evidence is denied judicial consideration.
Note, Chief Justice Traynor and the Parol Evidence Rule, 22 STAN. L. REV. 547, 550-
51 (1970). Corbin's criticism of any test excluding evidence which contradicts the
terms of a document, however, is identical to Wigmore's criticism of the same test.
Corbin stated that, although evidence which contradicts a writing will likely be im-
probable, it ought not be excluded absent a finding of integration. 3 A. CORBIN, supra
note 3, § 583, at 468-70. Wigmore also criticized elevating his "index for the judge,"
9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2430, at 98, to the level of a test, for to do so begs the
question, attempting "to decide whether something conceded to be different from the
writing ought to be excluded, by showing that it is different." Id. § 243 1, at 102. Thus
the distinction between Corbin's and Wigmore's positions breaks down; Wigmore's in-
dex is no more than an acknowledgement of one significant factor to which a judge
should look in evaluating credibility. Id. § 2430, at 98-99.
60. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2431, at 102.
61. Id.§ 2430, at 97-98.
62. See, e.g., Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 241, 250, 450
P.2d 470, 476 (1969).
63. A term is "integrated into" a writing when an integrated writing is sufficiently
complete that the parties are determined, by whatever test, to have covered its subject
by the writing.
A computer provides a good analogy. All possible terms on subjects intended by
the parties to be covered by the writing (the printout) are fed into the machine (the
negotiation process). Of the terms fed into the machine, not all will appear on the
printout, since some will be screened out by the negotiation process. These terms, al-
though not appearing on the writing, were nonetheless integrated into it. Such terms
must be found in the writing or they may not be proven. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 235 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
The mechanical test presumes that all possible terms on all subjects represented by
a transaction were "fed into the machine" and thus must appear on the printout or
be barred. The intent test, in contrast, seeks to determine whether a particular term
doesn't appear on the printout because it wasn't intended to be covered (not fed into
the machine) or because it was screened out by the negotiation process; it permits
terms of the former type to be proved, because parties are not required to integrate
all their terms.
64. See, e.g., Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 241, 249. 450




3. The objective test
The mechanical test and the intent test are both subjective;65 that
is, the object of both is to ascertain the actual intent of the parties. 66
The tests differ only in the amount of evidence considered most likely
to do so consistently. 67 The Washington courts have employed a third
test which ignores the parties' actual intent;68 instead, this test con-
siders evidence of the writing and of extrinsic terms in light of the
predispositions of a reasonable person.69
A court applying this standard, herein termed the "objective test,"
determines whether and to what extent a writing is integrated by con-
sidering whether a reasonable person would normally- or naturally
have integrated the subject of the extrinsic term in the writing, given
the nature of the writing and the additional term.7 0 This approach
does not limit the quantity of evidence the judge may consider, but
rather defines a formal standard7 ' by which this evidence is to be eval-
uated. The underlying assumption is that the actual intent of the par-
ties will most often be discerned by assuming that in the case at bar
they acted as reasonable persons would act.7 2 This assumption permits
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 238, Comment a (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1970).
66. See Washington Fish & Oyster Co. v. G.P. Halferty & Co., 44 Wn. 2d 646,
659-60, 269 P.2d 806, 814 (1954); 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 539; 4 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 3, § 633.
67. Compare 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 573, at 361-62, with 4 S. WILLISTON,
supra note.3, § 633, at 1014-15.
68. Shelton v. Fowler, 69 Wn. 2d 85, 95, 417 P.2d 350, 356 (1966); City Nat'l
Bank v. Moliter, 63 Wn. 2d 737, 388 P.2d 936 (1964); Becker v. Lagerquist Bros.,
55 Wn. 2d 425, 348 P.2d 423 (1960). See also Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wn. 2d 334, 348-
49, 205 P.2d 628, 636 (1949) (alternate holding).
Although the Becker opinion states the intent test, it looks to the nature of the
parties' agreement and the extrinsic term, rather than to the parties' actual intent, to
determine whether the subject of the term was integrated; thus the test it actually
applies is not the intent test at all.
69. Professor Williston stated: 'The point is not merely whether the court'is con-
vinced that the parties before it did in fact [simultaneously make both a written and a
parol agreement], but whether parties so situated generally would or might do so." 4
S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 638, at 1041. Although in Williston's view this test
serves only to distinguish collateral agreements from the principal integrated transac-
tion, it has been applied as a general test for determining whether an extrinsic term is
integrated into a writing. See cases cited in note 68 supra. See also notes 28-29 and
accompanying text supra.
70. The classic discussion of the "objective test" may be found in Mitchill v. Lath,
247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928). The test has support in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
7 1. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
72. Thus those who in good faith but unreasonably omit some terms from a writ-
ing receive no protection under this test. In this aspect, the objective test resembles
935
Washington Law Review
a court to ignore the actual intent of the parties before it (given the
possibility that they were unreasonable in their intent) without under-
cutting the notion that contract integration is dependent upon the in-
tent of parties generally. 73
The objective test has healthy support in the authorities, although it
has most commonly been applied to determine whether an agreement
is collateral: i.e., to determine the extent of integration.74 There is no
logical basis, however, for so restricting the test. The heart of the
objective test is its concern with the nature of the writing or term in-
volved. The test may appropriately be used to determine whether a
writing is integrated in fact; if such writings normally or naturally are
intended to be final expressions of the parties' agreement, the court
applying this test will not permit contradiction of the writing.75
4. Integration under the Uniform Commercial Code
Contracts for the sale of goods are governed in Washington by sec-
tion 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which defines the ex-
tent to which extrinsic evidence may be considered despite the exist-
ence of a writing.76 Section 2-202 precludes extrinsic evidence when
"confirmatory memoranda" exchanged by the parties agree on mate-
rial terms, 77 or when a court finds the instrument or instruments to
have been "intended by the parties as a final expression of their agree-
the tort principle that a person who lacks the capacity to act reasonably is nonetheless
held to the standard of the reasonable man. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108
(1881).
To apply the analogy of the computer, see note 63 supra, the objective test pre-
sumes that all terms on subjects which reasonable persons would feed into the machine
were in fact fed in and therefore must appear on the printout.
73. 4 S. WILLISTON. supra note 3, §§ 633, 637-638.
74. See sources cited at notes 68-70 supra.
75. E.g., University Properties, Inc. v. Moss, 63 Wn. 2d 619. 388 P.2d 543 (1964)
(leases are normally integrated).
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202 (1976) provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree
or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final ex-
pression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contempor-
aneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (RCW 62A.1-205) or by course of
performance (RCW 62A.2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing
to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement.
77. See id. § 62A.2-207 for additional provisions governing transactions involving
multiple memoranda.
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ment with respect to such terms as are included therein." 78 Exclusion
in the former situation amounts to estoppel; a party will not be per-
mitted to contradict the terms of his own memorandum.79 Exclusion
in the latter situation requires a preliminary finding by the court that
the parties intended the writing to be final on those terms included
within it.80 Consistent additional terms are permitted by section
2-202 absent a finding by the court that a writing was "intended also
as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms" 81 -i.e., that it
was completely integrated.
One difficulty with these provisions is ascertaining when extrinsic
terms contradict a writing, a problem which must be resolved by the
78. Id. § 62A.2-202.
79. Id. § 62A.2-207(3) similarly provides that in the event of partially consistent
writings, the terms "consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree."
80. The requirement that a court find a partial integration in order to exclude evi-
dence of inconsistent terms arises both from the text and structure of § 2-202. The
text forbids contradiction of terms "set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein."
Id. § 62A.2-202. A writing is not to be presumed to have been intended by both par-
ties as a final expression; the parties' intent must be ascertained by the court. Broude,
The Consuner and the Parol Evidence Rule: Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 1970 DUKE LJ. 881, 905-07 (1970). The structure of § 2-202 supports
this conclusion. It reveals two levels of inquiry into integration: first, in order to ex-
clude evidence contradicting terms of a writing, the court must find the parties intended
it as a final expression of the agreement; second, in order to exclude evidence of con-
sistent additional terms, the court must find the parties intended it as a complete and
exclusive statement. In the latter case, the requirement of judicial inquiry is explicit,
suggesting a similar requirement for ascertaining integration under the former situa-
tion. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202(b) (1976).
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202(b) (1976).
The controversy regarding integration often focuses on the effect to be given so-
called "merger clauses," which explicitly address the extent to which a writing is in-
tended to be the sole repository of a transaction's terms. See generally Comment,
The "Merger Clause" and the Parol Evidence Rule, 27 TEX. L. REV. 361 (1949). For
examples of such clauses designed for use under the U.C.C., see W. SHATrUCK & R.
COSWAY, WASHINGTON PRACTICE Uniform Commercial Code Forms § 2-202, at 64-66
(1967). The term "merger clause" herein refers only to clauses purporting to exclude
evidence of terms arising prior to execution of the writing, not to clauses purporting
to govern subsequent modifications. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-209 (1976) (mod-
ification, rescission, and waiver).
The mechanical rule gives conclusive effect to a merger clause, absent grounds for
avoiding the transaction. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 633, at 1014. Although Cor-
bin also would generally give effect to such clauses absent fraud, 3 A. CORBIN, supra
note 3, § 578, some courts utilizing the intent test have treated them as recitals of
fact which may be false. See, e.g., Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc., 75 Wn.
2d 241, 250,450 P.2d 470, 475-76 (1969).
The history of U.C.C. § 2-202 makes clear that its authors did not intend that merg-
er clauses be given conclusive effect. The American Law Institute considered modify-
ing it to require enforcement of merger clauses; Professor Llewelyn criticized the
amendment, however, on the ground it would unduly tie the hands of a court, and
the Institute defeated the amendment. 21 ALI PROCEEDINGS 90-91 (1943-1944).
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judge through interpretation. 82 To the extent that a judge, interpreting
the written terms in light of the parties' course of dealing, usage of
trade, and course of performance, finds that extrinsic terms contradict
the writing, those terms may not be considered by the trier of fact.83
The structure of section 2-202 reveals a three-step methodology.
First, a court must exclude evidence contradicting memoranda be-
tween the parties which agree on material terms. Second, a court
must determine in cases of single or inconsistent writings whether the
parties intended any writing to be an integrated, final expression of
their intent. Third, if consistent additional terms are alleged, the court
must ascertain whether the parties intended the writing not only as a
final expression, but "also as a complete and exclusive statement of
the terms."84
The standards by which these determinations are to be made under
section 2-202 reflect a compromise between the various policies un-
derlying the mechanical, objective, and intent tests. Where memo-
randa of the parties agree, the approach of the mechanical test seems
to be preserved; to the extent of such agreement, the court must find
the transaction to be integrated. 85 Although the section outlines no
clear standard for the inquiry into whether other writings were in-
tended to be "final expressions," it seems to require a subjective
finding of actual intent, which supports the utilization of either the
82. Here, at the point of ascertaining a writing's terms and their consistency with
extrinsic evidence, interpretation and the integration doctrine are most closely associ-
ated. See note 128 infra.
83. This preliminary interpretation is particularly crucial when a writing is found
to be only partially integrated, for such writings are always affected to some degree
by the terms omitted from them. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 581. at 441.
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202 (1976). See note 76 supra.
85. The statute equates " [t] erms with respect to which the confirmatory memor-
anda of the parties agree" with terms "set forth in a writing intended by the parties
as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein." Id. In doing so, it does not require courts to make any finding that such
terms are final or integrated; it creates a partial integration by operation of law by
simply defining such terms as final expressions. See also Comment, An Anatomy of
Sections 2-201 and 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code (The Statute of Frauds
and the Parol Evidence Rule), 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 381, 392-93 (1962-63).
This result is also required by § 2-207(3), which provides:(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the termns of the particular con-
tract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together
with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this
Title.
WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-207(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
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mechanical or the intent test.86 The final inquiry, into the extent of
integration, reflects the influence of the objective test; the official
comments direct the court to look to the nature of the writing and of
the extrinsic terms to determine whether the additional terms are such
that, had they been agreed upon, they would certainly have been in-
cluded in the instrument. 87
Section 2-202, therefore, incorporates aspects of each of the three
86. See notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text supra. Although some commen-
tators conclude that § 2-202 gives no guidance regarding the standard for determining
whether parties intended a final expression, relegating the issue to pre-Code standards,
others suggest that § 2-202 requires a finding of actual intent. Compare J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-10, at
69 (1972) and Comment, supra note 85, at 393, with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
62A.2-202, Washington Comment ii (1966); 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 1, § 121,
at 132; and Broude, supra note 80, at 905-07.
The bare fact that the statute uses the word "intended" sheds no light on whether
actual intent is required, for the official comments endorse an objective test, not de-
pendent on actual intent, to govern whether the parties "intended" the writing as a
complete and exclusive statement. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-202, Official Com-
ment 3 (1966). Comment 2 does suggest that actual intent is to be required how-
ever: "2. Paragraph (a) makes admissible evidence of course of dealing, usage of
trade, and course of performance to explain or supplement the terms of any writing
stating the agreement of the parties in order that the true understanding of the parties
as to the agreement may be reached." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-202, Official
Comment 2 (1966) (emphasis added).
87. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-202, Official Comment 3 (1966) provides:
3. Under paragraph (b) consistent additional terms, not reduced to writing,
may be proved unless the court finds that the writing was intended by both par-
ties as a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms. If the additional terms
are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the
document in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must
be kept from the trier of fact.
This standard parallels the objective test except it requires a greater showing of ob-jective probability; the standard is not what persons naturally or normally do, but
whether the parties would certainly have included such terms if they were made.
This more stringent objective standard comports with the structure of the statute.
Section 2-202 places the burden of proof on the party which claims a writing to be
complete and exclusive by permitting additional terms unless a court finds a complete
integration. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 86, § 2-10, at 69. The more common
pre-Code approach assumes that writings are completely integrated until a party
demonstrates why "resort to extrinsic evidence" is appropriate. See, e.g., Green River
Valley Foundation, Inc. v. Foster, 78 Wn. 2d 245, 248, 473 P.2d 844, 847 (1970);
Grant County Constructors v. E.V. Lane Corp., 77 Wn. 2d 110, 121, 459 P.2d 947,
954(1969).
The provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts on parol evidence have
generally extended the UCC policies in this area to all contracts. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 239-242 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1971); 1971 ALI PROCEEDINGS
442 (1971). In an interesting exception, however, the Restatement (Second) endorsed
the objective test as outlined in Part II-A-3 above, using the standard of the normal
or natural actions of a reasonable person, rather than the more stringent standard of
certainty endorsed in Comment 3 of § 2-202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 242, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1971). The reasons for this exception
are unclear. 1971 ALI PROCEEDINGS 454-59 (1971).
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standards, presumably to maximize the benefits of each. It avoids the
harshness of enforcing terms to which the parties did not assent, a
possible result under the objective test, by focusing on actual intent to
establish the fact of integration.8 8 It preserves some benefits of the
mechanical test by prohibiting the contradiction of writings to which
the parties' assent is found. 89 In addition, the predictability of the
objective test is promoted by evaluating the extent of integration ac-
cording to a "reasonable person" standard. In fusing elements of all
three tests, section 2-202 outlines an approach which may be suffi-
ciently flexible to avoid both the mapping difficulties of the mechan-
ical test 90 and the indifference to actual intent inherent in the objec-
tive test.9 1 At the same time, its provisions are sufficiently objective to
ensure the predictable enforcement of well-drawn and carefully nego-
tiated agreements.
5. The need for predictable standards
The past three decades have seen the Washington Supreme Court
undermine the supremacy of the mechanical test by intermittently uti-
lizing other standards. 2 The uncertainty resulting from these incon-
sistent standards has left courts free to adopt whatever approach
seems best suited to the case at hand, thus impairing the ability of
lawyers and litigants to plan transactions and predict court rulings.
Determining whether writings are final, i.e., the fact of integration,
has not proven to be a source of difficulty; the issue has arisen in only
a few Washington cases. 93 Apparently, transactions of consequence
88. It has been suggested that the concern of § 2-202 with the actual intent of
both parties constitutes a substantial modification of the common law parol evidence
rule. Broude, supra note 80, at 886-90, 905-07.
89. In cases involving fraud, mistake, or unconscionability, evidence contradicting
a writing may be permitted. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 62A.1-103, .2-302, .2-721 (1976).
90. See notes 44-51 supra. The mechanical test assumes that the parties' actual
intent can best be determined on a consistent basis by looking only to their writing.
Whereas this assumption may be warranted in the case of carefully negotiated com-
mercial contracts, it seems less so in other situations. Green River Valley Foundation.
Inc. v. Foster, 78 Wn. 2d 245, 257-60, 473 P.2d 844, 851-53 (1970) (concurring
opinion).
91. See Part II-A-3 supra.
92. See Parts II-A-2 and II-A-3 supra.
93. Heath Northwest, Inc. v. Peterson, 67 Wn. 2d 582, 584, 408 P.2d 896, 897
(1965); Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wn. 2d 41, 216 P.2d 196 (1950); Mapes v. Santa
Cruz Fruit Packing Corp., 26 Wn. 2d 145, 173 P.2d 182 (1946). See also University
Properties, Inc. v. Moss, 63 Wn. 2d 619, 621, 388 P.2d 543, 544 (1964) (dictum ap-
plying objective test to fact of integration).
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are rarely put in writing unless the parties expect the writing to have
some final effect. What confusion and uncertainty have arisen revolve
around whether writings are complete and exclusive, i.e., the extent
rather than the fact of integration. Analysis of Washington decisions
reveals significant inconsistencies stemming from the differing stand-
ards which Washington courts have used to deal with integration.
Although several decisions verbalize one standard while utilizing an-
other,94 the mechanical, intent, and objective tests have generally been
applied in discrete lines of cases, which neither iacknowledge the exist-
ence of alternate standards nor overrule them.95 Only recently has the
Washington Court of Appeals confronted the application of these dis-
parate standards. 96
Two patterns worthy of note emerge from these cases. Those Wash-
ington Supreme Court opinions which reject the mechanical test re-
flect increasing reluctance to give effect to "merger clauses";97 argu-
94. E.g., Dix Steel Co. v. Miles Const. Co., 74 Wn. 2d 114, 443 P.2d 532 (1968)
(stated objective test and applied intent test); Becker v. Lagerquist Bros., 55 Wn. 2d
425, 348 P.2d 423 (1960) (stated intent test and applied objective test).
95. Cases utilizing the mechanical test include Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp.,
72 Wn. 2d 109, 431 P.2d 961 (1967); Health Northwest, Inc. v. Peterson, 67 Wn. 2d
582, 408 P.2d 896 (1965); Seattle-First Nat'1 Bank v. Pearson, 63 Wn. 2d 890, 389
P.2d 665 (1964); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975);
Brother Int'l Corp. v. Nat'l Vacuum & Sewing Mach. Co., 9 Wn. App. 154, 510 P.2d
1162 (1973); and Schinnel v. Doyle, 6 Wn. App. 830, 496 P.2d 566 (1972).
Cases adopting the intent test include Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc., 75
Wn. 2d 241, 450 P.2d 470 (1969); University Properties, Inc. v. Moss, 63 Wn. 2d
619, 388 P.2d 543 (1964); Dawson v. Schearer, 53 Wn. 2d 766, 337 P.2d 46 (1959);
Barber v. Rochester, 52 Wn. 2d 691, 328 P.2d 711 (1958); Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v.
Olympic Foundry Co.. 17 Wn. App. 761, 565 P.2d 819 (1977); Barovic v. Cochran
Elec. Co., I1 Wn. App. 563, 524 P.2d 261 (1974); Lynch v. Higley, 8 Wn. App. 903,
510 P.2d 663 (1973); and Diel v. Beekman, I Wn. App. 874, 465 P.2d 212 (1970).
The objective test was applied in Shelton v. Fowler, 69 Wn. 2d 85, 417 P.2d 350
(1966); City Nat'l Bank v. Molitor, 63 Wn. 2d 737, 388 P.2d 936 (1964); and Becker
v. Lagerquist Bros., 55 Wn. 2d 425, 348 P.2d 423 (1960). See also Buyken v. Ertner,
33 Wn. 2d 334, 205 P.2d 628 (1949) (alternate holding).
96. As a result of the indecision in this area, the most recent court of appeals
opinions appear to conflict with the recent decisions of the supreme court. The pri-
mary Washington statements of the intent test appear in a series of Washington Su-
preme Court opinions written by Justice Foster. See Becker v. Lagerquist Bros., 55
Wn. 2d 425, 348 P.2d 423 (1960); Dawson v. Shearer, 53 Wn. 2d 766, 337 P.2d 46
(1959); and Barber v. Rochester, 52 Wn. 2d 691, 328 P.2d 711 (1958). Since Justice
Foster's death in 1962, the supreme court has utilized the intent test with decreasing
frequency, see notes 94-95 supra, and its most recent opinions tend to reaffirm the
mechanical test. See Green River Valley Foundation, Inc. v. Foster, 78 Wn. 2d 245,
473 P.2d 844 (1970); Grant County Constructors v. E.V. Lane Corp., 77 Wn. 2d
110, 120-21,459 P.2d 947 (1969); 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 1, § 121.
In contrast, those cases in the Washington Court of Appeals which acknowledge
the conflict and take a position generally adopt the intent test. See cases cited in note 31
supra.
97. See note 81 supra.
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ably this signals a greater willingness to look beyond formalisms to the
substance of a transaction. 98 A more general development is an in-
creasing willingness to analyze parol evidence problems by focusing
on the question of integration, rather than disposing of them with
summary recitations of the parol evidence rule. This treatment tends
to expose the bases for judicial rulings on extrinsic evidence, rather
than concealing them behind the rule.99
In Green River Valley Foundation, Inc. v. Foster,100 the most re-
cent state supreme court opinion to address a parol evidence problem,
the court was presented for the first time with a case in which the par-
ties raised the conflict between the mechanical and intent tests, each
relying on a different standard. 101 After pondering the case for two
years, the court avoided the parol evidence issue and did not decide
whether the parties' agreement was integrated. 102
Notwithstanding its failure to dispose of the problem of inconsis-
tent standards, the court in Green River presupposed the continuing
98. Earlier Washington cases have held that a merger clause which excludes war-
ranties may not be challenged. Jones v. Mallon. 3 Wn. 2d 382, 101 P.2d 332 (1940):
Webster v. Romano Eng'r Corp., 178 Wash. 118, 34 P.2d 428 (1934). One more re-
cent case limited a general merger clause to establishing the fact of integration; it
then determined the extent of integration by applying the objective test. Becker v.
Lagerquist Bros., 55 Wn. 2d 425, 348 P.2d 423 (1960). The effect was to deny the
clause preclusive effect. This trend continued in Black v. Evergreen Land Develop-
ers, Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 241, 450 P.2d 470 (1969), which denied such a clause any con-
clusive effect whatsoever; the clause was treated as rebuttable evidence that the writ-
ing was integrated.
99. See, e.g., Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc. 75 Wn. 2d 241. 450 P.2d
470 (1969); Dix Steel Co. v. Miles Const. Co., 74 Wn. 2d 114, 443 P.2d 532 (1968);
University Properties, Inc. v. Moss, 63 Wn. 2d 219, 388 P.2d 543 (1964). But see
Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wn. 2d 109, 121, 431 P.2d 961, 968 (1967):
Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn. App. 80, 82, 538 P.2d 1238. 1242-43 (1975).
100. 78 Wn. 2d 245, 473 P.2d 844 (1970).
101. Although the court was asked to choose between the mechanical and intent
tests in Shelton v. Fowler, 69 Wn. 2d 85, 417 P.2d 350 (1966), the plaintiff in that
case sought to fit within the factual pattern of Becker v. Lagerquist Bros., 55 Wn. 2d
425. 348 P.2d 423 (1960), without extensive argument of the theory behind the intent
test. Brief of Appellant at 6-17, Shelton v. Fowler. 69 Wn. 2d 85. 417 P.2d 470
(1966).
102. The parties in Green River focused their arguments on the propriety of con-
sidering certain extrinsic evidence. Brief of Appellant at 9. 16-17. Brief of Respond-
ents at 7-8. Green River Valley Foundation. Inc. v. Foster. 78 Wn. 2d 245. 473 P.2d
844 (1970). The court expended considerable time and effort on the parol evidence
issue before eliminating it by use of various techniques of construction. 78 Wn. 2d at
252. 473 P.2d at 848.
The court decided the case sua sponte, finding alternatively that (a) the writings
involved, properly construed, were unambiguous or (b) even absent such construction,
differences between the writings created ambiguity justifying the use of extrinsic evi-
dence. 78 Wn. 2d at 248. 473 P.2d at 846.
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vitality of the mechanical test.103 Its alternative holdings rest on the
principle that facially complete and unambiguous writings preclude
consideration of extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' actual in-
tent.'04 Even Justice Finley, who attacked the majority disposition,
seemed to concede that the mechanical test reflects current law.'0 5
In Green River, the Washington Supreme Court indicated its will-
ingness to dispel the confusion between the mechanical, intent, and
objective tests when the issue arises in an appropriate case.' 06 A defi-
nitive resolution would substantially eliminate the dark subtleties
which have plagued Washington's parol evidence rule. 07 The time is
especially ripe for a clarification since all relevant supreme court deci-
sions to date arose prior to the effective date of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.'08 In the interest of uniformity, section 2-202109 should
figure prominently in any judicial reconsideration of the problems in
this area.
B. Diverse Methodologies in Washington Law
1. Two approaches
The erosion of the mechanical test in recent years is linked to one
further factor evident in Washington decisions, namely, a gradual
shift in the methodologyby which courts address integration issues.
Two general approaches to integration problems are distinguishable
in Washington cases." 0 The predominant one may be termed the
103. See Part I-A-1 supra.
104. 78 Wn. 2d at 249-50, 473 P.2d at 847.
105. Id. at 252-54, 473 P.2d at 848-49. Justice Finley's opinion proceeds on the
premise that it proposes a major change in the law; he urged adoption of "the standard
of commercial reasonableness" as a test for determining the fact and extent of inte-
gration. The standard which he suggested combines the objective and intent tests:
(a) courts should look to the nature of the agreement in light of the parties' expertise
to determine whether it is reasonable for such parties to omit additional terms from
such an agreement; (b) if such omission is reasonable, courts should consider the
parties' intent regarding additional terms. Id. at 257-61, 473 P.2d at 851-53.
106. Id. at 249 n.1,473 P.2d at 846 n.l.
107. See J. THAYER, supra note 2, at 390.
108. The U.C.C. was adopted in Washington on April 8, 1965, and became effec-
tive on June 30, 1967.
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202 (1976). See Part IV infra.
110. Methodology in parol evidence problems is primarily significant at the trial
court level where most such determinations are made. It is possible that the methodol-
ogies reflected in the opinions of the Washington Supreme Court and Court of Ap-
peals do not accord with the practical methodologies utilized at the trial level. It will
943
Washington Law Review Vol. 52: 923, 1977
"rule-exception" approach. Most opinions which address integration
proceed as if the fact of integration is the crucial determination.
Because the finality of a writing (as far as it goes) is rarely seriously
contested, merely invoking the parol evidence rule often suffices to dis-
pose of this issue.' 11 The extent of integration is then commonly ig-
nored, except insofar as "exceptions" to the rule are found to apply. 1
12
An alternate methodology, herein termed the "preliminary examina-
tion" approach, seeks to ascertain the fact and extent of integration
prior to applying the parol evidence rule.' 1 3
The primary difference between the "rule-exception" and the "pre-
liminary examination" approaches is that courts applying the former
proceed on the assumption that writings before them found to be final
are also complete, at least until evidence to the contrary is offered."
4
The "preliminary examination" approach permits no such assump-
tion. It requires a court to look to the basis for the parol evidence
rule, applying the rule only if appropriate. 1 5
The shift to the "preliminary examination" approach for integra-
be assumed herein that trial courts adopt the methodology as well as the standards
laid out in Washington appellate opinions.
I 1. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
112. For discussions of the various "exceptions" to the parol evidence rule, see
Dano, supra note 30, and 5 R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 1, §§ 121-132. This com-
ment undertakes no systematic treatment of these exceptions; in the author's view.
courts should focus not on whether a defined exception to the rule may be found, but
on whether, in light of the doctrine of integration, the rule applies in the first place.
113. E.g., Barber v. Rochester, 52 Wn. 2d 691, 328 P.2d 711 (1958). The supreme
court in Barber held that the trial court erred by refusing to consider all relevant evi-
dence before applying the parol evidence rule.
114. Although this distinction is analogous to the difference in the amount of
evidence permissible under the mechanical, intent, and objective tests, the two are not
identical. Courts applying the mechanical test commonly leave unclear which meth-
odology was followed, because the only preliminary examination permitted under the
mechanical test is directed at the writing. The methodologies are most easily distin-
guished by looking to a court's stated reasons for excluding or considering extrinsic
evidence. Washington appellate courts predominantly cite as the reason for excluding
extrinsic evidence the general proposition that writings are integrated, not an evalua-
tion that the writing before them evinces an intent of the parties to integrate their
agreement. See, e.g., Shelton v. Fowler, 69 Wn. 2d 85, 417 P.2d 350 (1966); Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 63 Wn. 2d 890, 389 P.2d 665 (1964); Fleetham v.
Schneekloth, 52 Wn. 2d 176, 324 P.2d 429 (1958).
115. The practical consequence of this difference in methodology is in the burden
of proving to the judge whether or not a writing is final and complete. Under the "rule-
exception" methodology, a court begins from the general proposition of the parol evi-
dence rule that extrinsic evidence is to be excluded, thus placing the burden on the
party contesting the writing. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 86, § 2-10. The
"preliminary examination" approach is theoretically neutral regarding burdens, al-
though the U.C.C. version of that methodology tends to place the burden on the party
seeking to exclude the evidence. See note 87 supra.
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tion issues is only gradually becoming apparent and is by no means
settled. 116 It has its roots in an increasing application of the intent and
objective tests, which require more extensive judicial inquiries into the
fact and extent of integration than does the mechanical test.1 7 This
approach also has support in the methodology outlined by section
2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which appears to proceed
from the assumption (contrary to the "rule-exception" approach) that
writings, even if final, are not complete unless shown to be so.118
The common denominator in these developments is an increasing
focus on integration as a basis for the application of the parol evi-
dence rule, rather than the rule itself being the starting point for judi-
cial analysis. Insofar as the doctrine of integration continues to define
the threshold inquiries in parol evidence cases, the "preliminary exam-
ination" approach promises to gain increasing acceptance as a model
of judicial procedure.
2. Addressing the right issues
The predominant use of the "rule-exception" methodology in
Washington cases has contributed to the uncertainties surrounding the
parol evidence rule. Its primary drawback is the imprecision it pro-
motes by focusing only secondarily upon whether a writing was in-
tended to be completely or partially integrated.
116. Washington Supreme Court decisions only occasionally manifest the "pre-
liminary examination" methodology. The primary examples are City Nat'1 Bank v.
Molitor, 63 Wn. 2d 737, 388 P.2d 936 (1964); Dawson v. Shearer, 53 Wn. 2d 766,
337 P.2d 46 (1959); Barber v. Rochester, 52 Wn. 2d 691, 328 P.2d 711 (1958); and
Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wn. 2d 41, 216 P.2d 196 (1950). The court's most recent de-
cisions uniformly utilize the "rule-exception" approach, regardless of the standard ap-
plied. See, e.g., Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 241, 450 P.2d
470 (1969).
The Washington Court of Appeals has utilized both approaches, although the "pre-
liminary examination" model has predominated. It appears in Barovic v. Cochran
Elec. Co., 11 Wn. App. 563, 524 P.2d 261 (1974); Lynch v. Higley, 8 Wn. App. 903,
510 P.2d 663 (1973); Pederson v. Peters, 6 Wn. App. 908, 496 P.2d 970 (1972);
Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Pay'n Save, 2 Wn. App. 728, 469 P.2d 571 (1970);
and Diel v. Beekman, I Wn. App. 874, 465 P.2d 212 (1970). The "rule-exception"
methodology prevails in Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn. App. 80, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975);
Brother Int'l Corp. v. Nat'l Vacuum & Sewing Mach. Co., 9 Wn. App. 154, 510 P.2d
1162 (1973); and Schinnel v. Doyle, 6 Wn. App. 830, 496 P.2d 566 (1972).
117. Although a sizable number of cases apply the intent or objective tests through
the "rule-exception" methodology, the author has found no case which clearly utilizes
the "preliminary examination" methodology and applies the mechanical test. See note
114 supra.
118. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 86, § 2-10.
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The "rule-exception" methodology focuses primarily upon the
parol evidence rule and its so-called exceptions.1 19 This approach
tends to overemphasize the proscriptive element of the rule (extrinsic
evidence is barred) and overlook its limiting caveat (extrinsic evidence
is barred to the extent a writing is integrated).1 20 In some cases, this
misplaced emphasis leaves the rule divorced almost entirely from any
independent indications of the parties' intent regarding integration,
reducing it to a shibboleth based on the inaccurate assumption that
writings are necessarily integrated. 121 In other less dramatic cases, the
court's preoccupation with the rule's proscriptive element has merely
obscured the basis for its ruling.122
The emphasis of this approach on "exceptions" has also created
excesses. The primary exceptions to the parol evidence rule are those
in favor of collateral agreements and partial integrations.' 23 The
Washington Supreme Court in several cases seems to have abandoned
the proscription of the rule, emphasizing these exceptions under the
intent and objective tests to the point where they leave little room to
apply the rule. 124 The rule itself is based on the integration doctrine;
exceptions which merely exempt all terms not integrated beg the ques-
tion, failing to address the crucial issue of how to determine whether
or not the terms are integrated.
These maladies--overemphasis on the rule and its exceptions-
are the twin results of distracting judicial attention from the primary
issue presented by evidence of extrinsic terms. That issue, whether the
parties intended a writing to have been a final and complete state-
ment, should consistently be addressed at the outset when additional
terms are pleaded. The "rule-exception" methodology discourages
119. See Part 1I-B-I supra.
120. This emphasis on the rule's prohibition is consistent with the traditional no-
tion that writings generally are considered to be completely integrated until proven
otherwise. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 86, § 2-10, at 69.
121. See Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wn. 2d 109, 431 P.2d 961 (1967);
Schinnell v. Doyle, 6 Wn. App. 830, 496 P.2d 566 (1972). See also Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Nicholas, 2 Wn. 2d 128, 97 P.2d 633 (1939) (outlining the presumption of
integration). Cf. Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 241, 450 P.2d
470 (1969) (reversing trial court's assumption of integration).
122. See Heath Northwest, Inc. v. Peterson, 67 Wn. 2d 582, 408 P.2d 896 (1965);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 63 Wn. 2d 890, 389 P.2d 665 (1964); Fleetham
v. Schneekloth, 52 Wn. 2d 176, 324 P.2d 429 (1958); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn.
App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975).
123. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
124. See cases cited in note 99 supra.
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such inquiry and provides no discernable benefit to counterbalance its
difficulties. 12 5
Not only does the "preliminary examination" approach find sup-
port in some of the Washington decisions;126 it also is consistent with
section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which requires that
writings be demonstrably final and complete before relevant evidence
is excluded. 127 Washington courts should adopt this methodology be-
cause it encourages clarity by assuring that the courts consider at the
outset the fundamental principles upon which applicability of the
parol evidence rule is based.
III. PAROL EVIDENCE OFFERED IN AID OF
INTERPRETATION
Extrinsic evidence is often offered for the purpose of clarifying the
meaning of an instrument's terms. Such evidence seeks only to explain
rather than change terms; thus it is unaffected by the rule. 25 Never-
theless, confusion arises because courts mistakenly apply the "parol
evidence rule" label to rules defining the competence of interpretive
evidence.129
125. Arguably the "rule-exception" methodology serves as an aid to judicial con-
venience by avoiding inquiry into uncontested issues. This hardly outweighs the detri-
ments of imprecision which seem to have accompanied its use, however. See notes 121-
22 supra.
126. See note 116 supra.
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202 (1976). See notes 76-91 and accompanying
text supra.
128. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 579; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 217; 4
S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 631, at 955.
To an extent, the claim that evidence admitted to explain a writing does not vary
its terms is tautological. It presumes that the writing in fact means that which the
evidence was offered to show. Any extrinsic evidence varies the terms of an instru-
ment, if only by clarifyng them, or else such evidence would not be offered. 4 S. WIL-
LISTON, supra note 3, § 639, at 1049. Nevertheless, a court seeking to interpret a
writing must do so either with the aid of extrinsic evidence or without it; the alterna-
tive, to refuse enforcement to any writing requiring interpretation, is untenable. In-
terpretation without the aid of extrinsic evidence results in enforcing the court's im-
pression of the terms' meaning, which may not be the meaning adopted by the parties.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442
P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968) (Traynor, CJ.). Accordingly, a court should
inquire into the parties' intent regarding those terms. Admitting evidence of that in-
tent is consistent with the parol evidence rule, since it is necessary in order to ascer-
tain what the terms are. See generally Corbin, The Intrepretation of Words and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965).
129. J. TIIAYER, supra note 2, at 410-14; 9 J. WIGMOan, supra note 2, §§ 2400,




The parol evidence rule has been said to exclude evidence absent
ambiguity on the face of an instrument.1 30 This invokes a coarse
analogy between the apparent completeness of a writing, which bars
extrinsic evidence under the mechanical test, and its apparent clarity,
which relates to the need for interpretation.131 The difficulty with sub-
suming both integration and interpretation under the label "parol evi-
dence rule" is that they involve different policy considerations; the
doctrine of integration protects integrated writings from variation by
agreements extrinsic to them, whereas interpretive rules define the
extent to which the language admittedly a part of a writing may be
shown to have particular, or peculiar, meanings.132
This section focuses on the extent to which courts may consider
evidence offered to interpret language which is not patently ambigu-
ous, examining Washington court decisions and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
A. Interpretation in Washington Decisions
As in the area of integration, the Washington Supreme Court has
been inconsistent in ruling on interpretive evidence, permitting exami-
nation of circumstances surrounding the execution of a facially unam-
biguous writing in some cases and refusing to permit it in others. 133
The former cases134 adopt the position, favored by Corbin, Williston,
and both Restatements, that pertinent evidence of the circumstances
surrounding a document's execution may always be shown for in-
terpretive purposes (the "context rule").135 The latter cases adopt the
position that a court may not look beyond a document's terms absent
patent ambiguity (the "four corners rule"). 36 As Professor Shattuck
130. See, e.g., Grant County Constructors v. E.V. Lane Corp., 77 Wn. 2d 110,
121, 459 P.2d 947, 954 (1969); Fleetham v. Schneekloth, 52 Wn. 2d 176, 178-79,
324 P.2d 429, 430-31 (1958); Washington Fish & Oyster Co. v. G.P. Halferty & Co.,
44Wn. 2d 646, 658-59, 269 P.2d 806, 813 (1954).
131. Note, Chief Justice Traynor and the Parol Evidence Rule, 22 STAN. L. REV.
547, 555-56 (1970).
132. See generally Calamari & Perrillo, supra note 1, at 345-53; Corbin, The
Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965).
133. Shattuck, supra note 1, at 374-76 and cases cited.
134. See, e.g., Clements v. Olsen, 46 Wn. 2d 445, 282 P.2d 266 (1955); Carroll
Constr. Co. v. Smith, 37 Wn. 2d 322, 223 P.2d 606 (1950).
135. Shattuck, supra note 1, at 374-75; 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 536; 4 S. WIL-
LISTON, supra note 3, §§ 609, 618, 629; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 238 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
136. E.g., Jones v. Hollingsworth. 88 Wn. 2d 322. 560 P.2d 348 (1977): Grant
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pointed out, the cases which refuse to look beyond the four corners of
a document have justified this position as either a principle of inter-
pretation or an application of the parol evidence rule. He found nei-
ther rationale persuasive, stating that the former rests "on an assump-
tion about the clarity of written language which experience shows to
be ill-founded," while the latter fails because "what is to be protected
cannot be known until the writing has been interpreted.' 37
This comment does not evaluate the merits of the four corners rule
as a principle of interpretation. As an application of the parol evi-
dence rule, however, the four corners rule cannot be justified. Com-
mentators generally agree that exclusion of evidence under the parol
evidence rule rests on the doctrine of integration, which determines
where the terms of a transaction are to be found, not how a court may
undertake to understand those terms. 38 They differ, however, on the
chronological relationship between interpretation and the parol evi-
dence rule. Corbin suggests that interpretation is a condition prece-
dent to any valid application of the rule. 39 Williston, on the other
hand, maintains that until the terms of an integration have been iden-
tified, a court will not know what there is to interpret. 140 In practice,
it is undoubtedly a rare case which affords the judge an opportunity to
follow either approach in any neatly-drawn fashion.
An appropriate theoretical resolution of this problem might be
drawn from the distinction between determining the fact of integra-
tion and determining its extent. 14' Until a writing has been found to
be integrated in fact, there is no reason to exclude any relevant evi-
dence concerning it. Upon finding that the parties intended it as a
final expression of their agreement, i.e., at least a partial integration,
County Constructors v. E.V. Lane Corp., 77 Wn. 2d 110, 459 P.2d 947 (1969); Poggi
v. Tool Research & Eng'r Corp., 75 Wn. 2d 356, 451 P.2d 296 (1969).
137. Commenting on the inconsistent decisions, Shattuck continued:
These two groups of cases appear to be irreconcilable. The schism developed be-
fore 1937 and the fact of its existence has been ignored in the later cases. That
it is not known to the court seems unlikely. The cases are too numerous. Con-
flicting decisions are often close together in time. ...
It would be useful to know why the court permits this conflict to continue.
Shattuck, supra note 1, at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
138. See note l2supra.
139. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 579. See also Calamari & Perillo, supra note 1,
at 352; Shattuck, supra note 1, at 376-77.
140. He states that the parol evidence rule "fixes the subject matter for interpreta-
tion, though not itself a rule of interpretation." 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 631,
at 955.
141. See Part I-A supra.
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interpretation is required in order to protect it from contradiction. At
this point the judge must interpret the parties' terms. If any party
proves that the writing was intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the transaction, then all terms (regardless of their inter-
pretation) which fall outside the scope of the writing are to be kept
from the factfinder.
In the fifteen years since Shattuck raised his criticism, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court has taken no substantial step to resolve the
conflict between the four corners rule and the context rule. On the
contrary, it has compounded the difficulty in later decisions by ap-
proaching the problem in various inconsistent fashions.142
Two recent decisions of the Washington Court of Appeals have
recognized the continuing conflict between the four corners and con-
text rules. 143 In both cases the court found it unnecessary to choose
between them, although dictum suggests endorsement of the context
rule. 144
142. In one case, the court acknowledged the conflict and deferred its resolution
to a more appropriate case. Sommerfeldt v. Union Painting Co., 57 Wn. 2d 250, 254
n.2, 356 P.2d 601, 604 n.1 (1960).
In other cases, the court cited both traditions and proceeded as if they were con-
sistent, ignoring the conflict. For example, Professor Shattuck quoted Clements v.
Olsen, 46 Wn. 2d 445, 282 P.2d 266 (1955) to characterize the context rule and
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 44 Wn. 2d 488, 268 P.2d 654
(1954) to represent the four corners test. Shattuck, supra note 1, at 377. In Dickson
v. Hausman, 68 Wn. 2d 368, 370-71, 413 P.2d 378, 380 (1966) and Bremerton v.
Kitsap County Sewer Dist., 71 Wn. 2d 689, 699-700, 430 P.2d 956, 962 (1967) the
same language was quoted by the court as if there were no question of inconsistency.
See also Grant County Constructors v. E. V. Lane Corp., 77 Wn. 2d 110, 120-21, 459
P.2d 947, 953-54 (1969); Ramsey v. Sedlar, 75 Wn. 2d 901, 906, 454 P.2d 416, 419
(1969).
A third group of cases cited the four corners tradition as the accepted rule. Jacoby
v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 77 Wn. 2d 911, 916-17, 468 P.2d 666, 670 (1970);
Poggi v. Tool Research & Eng'r Corp., 75 Wn. 2d 356, 364-65, 451 P.2d 296, 301
(1969); Schauerman v. Haag, 68 Wn. 2d 868, 873, 416 P.2d 88, 91 (1966).
The fourth series of cases confused the parol evidence rule with the rules governing
interpretation. In Fleetham v. Schneekloth, 52 Wn. 2d 176, 324 P.2d 429 (1958), the
parol evidence rule was restated as follows:
[W] here there is no ambiguity, all conversations, contemporaneous negotiations,
and parol agreements between the parties prior to a written agreement are merged
therein. In the absence of accident, fraud, or mistake, parol evidence is not ad-
missible for the purpose of contradicting, subtracting from, adding to, or varying
the terms of such written instruments.
Id. at 178-79, 324 P.2d at 430. By its use of ambiguity, the court made the apparent
clarity of a writing dispositive of whether it is integrated, although even under the
mechanical test integration is a function of a writing's completeness. See Part II
supra; see also Grant County Constructors v. E.V. Lane Corp., 77 Wn. 2d 110, 459
P.2d 947 (1969); Heath Northwest, Inc. v. Peterson, 67 Wn. 2d 582, 408 P.2d 896
(1965); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 63 Wn. 2d 890, 389 P.2d 665 (1964).
143. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 15 Wn. App. 314, 549 P.2d 54
(1976); Eagle Ins. Co. v. Albright, 3 Wn. App. 256, 474 P.2d 920 (1970).
144. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Albright, 3 Wn. App. 256, 269, 474 P.2d 920, 929 (1970).
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B. Interpretation under the Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that writ-
ten terms may always be explained by course of dealing, usage of trade,
and course of performance; i.e., by all relevant circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of a document.145 The official comments ex-
plicitly reject any requirement that "a condition precedent to the ad-
missibility of [evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade, or course
of performance] is an original determination by the court that the
language used is ambiguous."'1 46 These factors demonstrate the Code's
rejection of the four comers rule, since that rule limits the admission
of extrinsic evidence for interpretive purposes to cases involving
patent ambiguities.
The position of the Code on interpretive evidence substantially
embraces the context rule, which permits consideration of circum-
stances surrounding an instrument's execution. 147 Under sections
1-205 and 2-208, the competence of such extrinsic evidence is lim-
ited to showing meanings which are consistent with the express terms
of a writing. 148 Since all language is ambiguous to some degree, even
terms which appear to be unambiguous must be understood in their
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-202(a) (1976).
146. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-202, Official Comment l(c) (1966).
147. Id. Wash. Comment (i).
148. Sections 1-205 and 2-208 of the Uniform Commercial Code provide that
the express terms of an agreement and any course of dealing, usage of trade, or course
of performance shall, if possible, be construed to be consistent with each other, but
if that is unreasonable, then "express terms shall control course of performance and
course of performance shall control both course of dealing and usage of trade." WASH.
REV. CODE § 62A.2-208(2) (1976) (citation omitted); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
62A.1-205 (1976).
As Professor Johnson has pointed out, the phrase "express terms" is susceptible of
two different interpretations: "a clear and unambiguous term of the writing," (a)
"determined as of the time it is signed" or (b) "as of the time of trial." Johnson,
Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code,
34 WASH. L. REV. 78, 103-04 (1959). The former definition would render meaningless
the provision of § 2-202 which admits evidence of course of performance without
requiring a finding of ambiguity, because any term found to be an express term, given
only factors known to the parties at the time of execution, would be unassailable by
evidence of course of performance. Such a consequence is inconsistent with the Code's
rejection of the four corners rule insofar as course of performance is concerned.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-208, Official Comment 2 (1966). Consequently, the
clarity of a term ought be ascertained as of the time of trial, after consideration of
course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance. Johnson, supra, at 104.
If the term is found to be unambiguous after consideration of these factors, evidence
of them is irrelevant and must be stricken. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-208 (1976).
951
Washington Law Review
proper context.1 49 Thus course of dealing, usage of trade, and course
of performance are relevant to show the nature of a writing's express
terms, despite the provision that express terms will control in the event
of inconsistency.
This view of a writing's express terms gives the trial judge the re-
sponsibility for protecting the parties' intended meanings. The judge
alone determines when the words of a writing are sufficiently unam-
biguous, notwithstanding any contrary evidence, to warrant the pro-
tection of section 2-208.15 0 This is quite consistent with the Code's
stance on integration, which assumes integration only to the extent
that memoranda from both parties agree and requires the judge to
find a complete or partial integration before relevant extrinsic evi-
dence is excluded. 51
IV. ANALOGICAL REASONING: A PROPOSAL
The merits of the formal and nonformal approaches to integration
and interpretation outlined above have been debated at length, 152 and
disagreement on the policies behind them undoubtedly will continue.
Considerations unrelated to the merits of these rules, however, favor a
policy of looking to the Uniform Commercial Code as a general guide
for resolving parol evidence problems.
The first consideration is the policy of encouraging uniformity in
the law. A substantial portion of parol evidence problems are now
governed by Article 2 of the Code. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts has recognized the general applicability of the Code princi-
ples concerning parol evidence and extended them to cover all con-
tracts. t53 Given the impact of the Code, there remains little reason to
persist with pre-Code approaches to integration and interpretation.
149. For a well-reasoned statement on ambiguity in language, see Chief Justice
Traynor's opinion in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968).
150. The statutory protection of § 2-208(2) is primarily a limitation upon the
fact finder; consequently, the determination whether given words constitute express
terms to be protected under it is legally, as well as practically, a judicial matter.
WASH. REV. COoE § 62A. 2-208(2) (1976).
151. See Part II-A-4 supra.
152. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 1; Sweet, supra note 12; Note, The Parol
Evidence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 972 (1969).
153. 1971 ALl PROCEEDINGS 442 (1971).
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Second, statutes have increasingly been accepted by courts as
policy statements from which to reason by analogy to areas which the
statutes do not technically govern.154 This is especially true of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which influences an increasing number of
areas heretofore dominated by common law principles. 155
Washington has already adopted the practice of analogizing from
the Code. In Baker v. Seattle,a56 the supreme court extended Wash-
ington's public policy on warranty disclaimers and limitations of rem-
edies, applicable to the sale of goods under sections 2-316157 and
2-719,158 to govern rental of goods as well. 159 Although no panacea,
a similar approach to the problems of extrinsic evidence would provide
more guidance than do present principles, and encourage a positive
development of uniformity in the law.
V. SUMMARY
Washington cases have used inconsistent standards to resolve diffi-
cult parol evidence and interpretation problems. Although the "me-
chanical test," which renders any writing purporting to embody a
complete transaction a completely integrated agreement, has long
been considered the rule in this state, recent cases have challenged its
supremacy. Some cases adopt the "intent test," which uses all relevant
evidence to ascertain the parties' actual intent, while others utilize the
"objective test," which demands an evaluation of the nature of the
writing involved to determine whether a reasonable person would
omit material terms. Similarly, the venerable "four corners rule" of
interpretation, barring extrinsic evidence absent a patent ambiguity,
has been drawn into question by judicial use of the less rigid "context
rule," which permits examination of the circumstances surrounding
the execution of writing in order to interpret it.
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs the sale
154. See generally Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, 2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 7
(1965); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
155. Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447 (1970-71).
156. 79 Wn. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971). Cf. House v. Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d 428,
457 P.2d 199 (1969) (extending an implied warranty of fitness to new houses).
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316 (1976).
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-719 (1976).
159. 79 Wn. 2d at 201-02, 484 P.2d at 407.
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of goods, has adopted policies which, although largely consistent with
the "intent test" and "context rule," aim to combine the advantages of
both the formal and the nonformal methodologies. Given the trial
judge's practical control over the resolution of parol evidence and
interpretive questions, there is little reason to fear commercial uncer-
tainty under the Code methodology. The present uncertainties in
Washington case law, however, require a definitive resolution. Exten-
sion of the policies adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code can
provide a much-needed resolution to the present uncertainties in
Washington case law dealing with interpretation and parol evidence.
Arden J. Olson
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